What Does the Moralization of Politics Mean? Populism, Social Identity, and Political Mobilization

Luis Miguel Jaraba

Universitat de Barcelona

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6188-217X

Abstract: This article examines what it means to describe contemporary politics as increasingly moralized and emotionally driven. It argues that these developments are intertwined because both arise from the construction of political identities in antagonistic terms. Drawing on philosophical accounts of the distinction between facts and values and on social identity theory, the article explains how political narratives connect descriptions of social reality with normative judgments, group expectations, and emotionally charged commitments. Populist rhetoric intensifies this process by portraying political conflict as a struggle between morally opposed groups, typically a virtuous people and a corrupt elite. Such narratives frame rival political projects as existential threats to valued identities and ways of life, thereby fostering mobilization while narrowing the space for coexistence, cooperation, and respect for diversity. The article concludes by questioning whether this form of divisive and emotionally charged mobilization strengthens democratic participation or instead encourages a culture-war logic that undermines democratic pluralism.

Keywords: moralization of politics, populism, social identity, political mobilization

ISSN: 3127-4560

https://doi.org/10.67647/humanrightsblog.2026.05

Academic researchers and political commentators frequently argue that, in the context of populism, we are witnessing the phenomenon of the ‘moralization’ of politics. They also point out that politics is increasingly driven by emotions rather than reason. Although these may be understood as two distinct processes from a conceptual standpoint, I argue that they are intertwined in practice and often refer to the same underlying phenomenon: the growing tendency to understand political identities—a particular form of social identity—in antagonistic terms. This tendency leads us to intensify our efforts to mobilize around the causes that matter to us, as we come to interpret the political projects of opposing groups as existential threats to our cherished ways of life. Broadly speaking, this is what it means to say that politics has become moralized and increasingly driven by emotions.

Some researchers conceptualize the moralization of politics as a process whereby political debates shift toward moral questions—what is right and what is wrong—rather than focusing on evidence-based arguments about how to address specific social problems through support for or opposition to particular public policies (Schaub, Tosun & Becker, 2025, p. 2). Meanwhile, researchers such as Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) argue that moralization extends to social identities, portraying the political landscape as a struggle between a ‘corrupt’ or ‘evil’ elite and a ‘pure’ or ‘virtuous’ people (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017, p. 11-12). In other words, politics becomes a struggle between antagonistic identity-based camps that understand themselves and others in moralized terms. This entails a Manichaean view of intergroup relations, rooted in the very narratives through which these political identities are constructed.

The world is not inherently moral in the sense that moral values are not observable properties of physical objects or events. David Hume famously distinguished between statements about what is and statements about what ought to be, highlighting the difficulty of deriving normative conclusions from purely descriptive premises (Hume, 1888, p. 469). Ludwig Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, argued that the world consists of facts and that these can either be the case or not be the case (Wittgenstein, 1922, p. 23).

However, ethical propositions are different. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argues that ethics cannot be expressed through propositions (Wittgenstein, 1922, p. 88) about what is or is not the case. Ethical value does not constitute another fact among the facts that make up the world. Consequently, ethical questions cannot be resolved simply by establishing the truth or falsity of empirical propositions through observation or experimentation.

When we discuss politics and morality, therefore, we do more than describe the world: we also evaluate it. Political discourse involves not only claims about what is but also judgments about what matters, what is desirable or undesirable, and what should be done. In this sense, political and moral reasoning belong to the realm of practical life, where we deliberate about human action and offer reasons for acting in particular ways. The moralization of politics can thus be understood as a process through which descriptions and interpretations of social reality become intertwined with normative judgments, shaping how political groups understand themselves, evaluate their opponents, and justify collective action.

However, we do not guide our moral conduct merely by adhering to what we consider random or arbitrary mandates. Rather, the strong influence of social morality depends on our perceiving it as compelling because it is underpinned by a narrative that makes it meaningful and valuable. Even moral actions grounded in custom and tradition have normative force precisely because we believe that they preserve a society or way of life that we consider worthy of protection.

Social identities cannot be maintained without a commitment to certain perceived group expectations. We ought to behave as we believe members of our group are expected to behave in order to maintain a positive self-evaluation as members of that group. Otherwise, we might regard ourselves as bad democrats, bad citizens, bad lawyers, badSpaniards, and so on. Our deviation from group norms may even reach a point at which it becomes difficult to consider ourselves members of a particular social group. By defining ourselves and others in terms of a set of group memberships, we also internalize group norms, understood as “cognitively stored attitudes about beliefs, feelings, and behaviors” (Wellen et al., 1998, p. 48). However, this drive is not merely rational; it is also emotional. It stems from sentiments such as the desire to belong, pride in our group memberships, love for our ways of life, and fear of potential existential threats to them.

Populist rhetoric promotes divisive, reductionist, and antagonistic narratives about social groups. It divides the population into bad elites and good common people. Note that the use of evaluative terms such as bad and goodprescribes how we ought to be and, consequently, how we ought to act: we should emulate the common people and reject the ways of thinking and behaving associated with the elites. However, this is presented not merely as a recommendation but as an urgent imperative necessary to ensure the survival of what we cherish as a group, including the values and ways of life that characterize our social identities. The conflict is interpreted as a ‘culture war’ in which there is no room for coexistence between opposing groups and in which the goal is to impose our own values on others.

Some conservatives genuinely believe that the traditional family is at risk when discourses advocating sexual and gender rights and opposing discrimination gain prominence. They may frame these discourses as threats to traditional values, referring to them using terms such as ‘gender ideology’ or ‘wokism’.

Strong emotions are mobilized by this kind of interpretation of society, encouraging greater activism and political engagement. But is this a positive form of mobilization? Does it promote democratic practices of cooperation and respect for diversity, or does it resemble a cultural crusade, driven by the fear that the values and ways of life we cherish are in decline and must be defended at all costs?

Bibliography:

Hume, D. (1888). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  

Mudde, C. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press. 

Schaub, S., Tosun, J. and Becker, M. (2026), Moralization in Policy Narratives: Insights From the Politics of Climate Change and Public Health. Policy Stud J, 54: e70050. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.70050

Wellen, J. M., Hogg, M. A., & Terry, D. J. (1998). Group norms and attitude–behavior consistency: The role of group salience and mood. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 2(1), 48–56. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2699.2.1.48 

Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd.